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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Senior Review Panel

NIC-01302-88

06 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Senior Review Panel Comments on Draft  
Concept Paper and Terms of Reference (TOR)  
for SNIE 11-16-88: The Likelihood and  
Implications of a Soviet Conventional Arms  
Control Gambit, internally dated 27 May 1988.

1. The Panel believes this highly speculative but first Community look at conventional arms control is potentially a most useful initiative. We think that the drafts are well-structured and that the Key Questions and the TOR identify the major intelligence issues.

2. We would suppose that the major problem of the proposed "examination of military, economic, and political issues from both the Soviet and NATO view" will likely be manageability of detail and maintenance of focus. Clarity about the analytical field, from the outset on, seems to us indispensable. We offer a few thoughts.

3. Parameters

a. Scope. The drafts appear to focus exclusively on Europe and NATO/Warsaw Pact interactions. Is there an intent to exclude other geographical areas and occasional Soviet proposals concerning them? If so, should the title be revised?

b. Time Frame. We assume that the projections will be short term (one or two years). Perhaps approval of the 1991-1995 Soviet Plan might be a convenient cut-off. Whatever the time frame, the draft should make it clear.

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c. CBW. As we understand it, "conventional arms control," in US usage generally excludes CBW, which has its own regime. We raise a question whether the estimate should deal briefly with possible new Soviet proposals or initiatives on CBW.

d. "Past Soviet Arms Control Initiatives," as an open ended phrase, occurs at TOR Outline I. The history covers forty-odd years, incessant oratory, and conferences without number. An annex reviewing, very briefly, the proposals of the Gorbachev years might well suffice.

e. Proposals vs. Initiatives. The draft sets up a dichotomy between Soviet "negotiation proposals" and "unilateral initiatives." Perhaps the possibility of a combination should be held open---a sweeping Soviet proposal accompanied by first installment unilateral actions.

4. Economic Issues. The effect of Soviet arms control proposals on Gorbachev's economic plans and prospective resource allocation decisions is of critical importance to the estimate. Accordingly, we think the text should include a few matrices projecting different Soviet force cuts with their consequent economies, losses, disruptions, industrial shifts, etc., if the proposals were implemented. Such speculation could be quite helpful in illuminating the various propositions of the estimate.



William Leonhart



John B. McPherson

cc: Chairman, NIC  
VC/NIC  
NIO for GPF

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